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Nor should Plaintiffs and members of the putative class have to endure the
humiliation and stigma associated with the receipt of marriage licenses that are
effectively imprinted with [Kim] Davis’ opprobrium. The marriage licenses
currently issued by the Rowan County Clerk’s Office are so materially altered
that they create a two-tier system of marriage licenses throughout [sic] state.
The adulterated marriage licenses received by Rowan County couples will
effectively feature a stamp of animus against the LGBT community.
—Motion by the American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky to the
1
Federal District Court in the Eastern District of Kentucky
September 21, 2015
[T]he prime purposes for which public policy maintained legal-tender money
most of the time were those of the administrative regularity and convenience of
the market and of government fiscal operations, and not to foster popular
acceptance of particular money.
—James Willard Hurst
2
A Legal History of Money in the United States, 1774-1970

FORMAL MARRIAGE
JEFFREY A. REDDING*
The aftermath of two recent and widely-anticipated United States Supreme
Court decisions, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores 3 and Obergefell v. Hodges, 4
has been as noteworthy as most people anticipated, and quite literally so.
1. Motion to Enforce September 3 and September 8 Orders at 8, Miller v. Davis, No. 0:15cv-00044-DLB (E.D. Ky. Sept. 21, 2015), ECF No. 120, http://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/
field_document/motion_to_enforce_final_filed.pdf [http://perma.cc/NS7N-CEAT].
2. JAMES WILLARD HURST, A LEGAL HISTORY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES,
1774−1970 44 (1973).
* Associate Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. This Article is based on a talk
delivered at the 2015 Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture on “Religious Freedom, Social
Justice and Public Policy” at Saint Louis University School of Law. The keynote lecture at this
event was delivered by Lawrence Sager, and I would like to thank him and the other presenters at
this event—namely Nelson Tebbe, Christopher Lund, Matt Bodie, Elizabeth Sepper, and Jessie
Hill—for their comments, critiques, and suggestions. I would also like to thank Chad Flanders for
the initial invitation to present, Monica Eppinger for her insights and encouragement, Lucas
Jackson for his helpful research assistance, and Micah Stanek for engaging in endless hours of
conversation with me about Kim Davis. This Article is dedicated to the band Survivor.
3. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
4. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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Indeed, after Hobby Lobby and Obergefell, paper forms—notes of a sort—have
become a new and hotly contested frontier in mediating the relationship
between religion and state in the United States.
For example, shortly after Hobby Lobby and the Court’s holding there that
closely held, religiously motivated, and contraceptively opposed corporations
cannot—according to the terms of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) 5—be compelled by the federal government to provide employee
health insurance benefits inclusive of contraceptive coverage, 6 religiously
motivated employers pressed a subsequent legal 7 right to not fill out paper
governmental forms 8 declaring these employers’ religious objections to paying
for contraceptive coverage. According to these plaintiffs, their objection to
form-filling was motivated by their view that any completion of these
governmental forms would, via the operation of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010, 9 trigger contraceptive coverage (albeit through
the more indirect mechanism of a third-party provider). Hence, to the extent
that, post-Hobby Lobby, persons are legally protected from having to
themselves provide religiously objectionable contraceptive coverage, so should
they be protected from having to fill out governmental forms which will
produce “the same” objectionable result. Or so the argument has gone.

5. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012).
6. Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the majority, described the question presented by this
case as follows: “We must decide [in this case] whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993 (RFRA) . . . permits the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
to demand that three closely held corporations provide health-insurance coverage for methods of
contraception that violate the sincerely held religious beliefs of the companies’ owners.” Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. Alito answered this question presented by writing, for the majority,
that “the [HHS] regulations that impose this obligation violate RFRA.” Id.
7. I say “legal” here to indicate that these challenges were premised on an interpretation of
the requirements of RFRA, rather than constitutional (First Amendment) grounds. But see Little
Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015) (argued and
decided on both RFRA and First Amendment grounds). In general, Circuit Court of Appeals
decisions in this line of cases include Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F. 3d 207 (2d
Cir. 2015); Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3rd Cir.
2015); East Texas Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2015); Michigan Catholic
Conference v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2015); Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d
606 (7th Cir. 2015); Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 2015); Grace Sch. v.
Burwell, 801 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2015); Sharpe Holdings v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
801 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2015); Dordt Coll. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2015); Priests for
Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
8. The objections included not only an objection to filling out the federal Employee
Benefits Security Administration’s “Form 700” but also an alternative developed by the federal
Department of Health and Human Services in response to concerns about Form 700 raised in
Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014), a companion case to Hobby Lobby.
9. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
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And after the Supreme Court’s holding in the Obergefell case that samesex couples have a fundamental right to marry under the United States
Constitution, 10 another set of high-profile disputes over paper forms—this
time, marriage licenses—broke out in Kentucky. These disputes proved so
intense that the now famous clerk for Kentucky’s Rowan County, Kim Davis,
ultimately suffered imprisonment by a federal district court judge for Davis’
refusal to (post-Obergefell) issue marriage licenses (to anyone 11) because of
her religious objections to being involved with same-sex marriage. 12 When
Davis was first sued for not issuing these marriage licenses, she defended
herself (in part) by arguing that, as an Apostolic Christian opposed to same-sex
marriage, she had a First Amendment Free Exercise Clause right to disregard
the thrust of the Obergefell decision and its seeming mandate that same-sex
marriage be available everywhere in the United States. When this argument
failed at the federal district court level, 13 and then at the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, 14 and then again at the Supreme Court, 15 Davis nonetheless refused to

10. This case, while decided on Equal Protection and Due Process grounds, can also be
considered to be a case about religion-state relations. Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
went out of its way to note that, despite the Court’s opinion,
[Opposing] religions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines [opposing same-sex
marriage], may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine
precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned. The First Amendment ensures that
religious organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the
principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own
deep aspirations to continue the family structure they have long revered. The same is true
of those who oppose same-sex marriage for other reasons . . . . The Constitution, however,
does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as
accorded to couples of the opposite sex.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
11. See Memorandum Opinion and Order at 1, Miller v. Davis, No. 0:15-cv-00044-DLB
(E.D. Ky. Aug. 12, 2015), EFC No. 43, http://www.aclu-ky.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/
Bunning-Rowan-Ruling-81215.pdf [http://perma.cc/6W8C-Y8EN] (describing how, nearly
immediately after the Supreme Court’s announcement of its Obergefell decision, “Davis
announced that the Rowan County Clerk’s Office would no longer issue marriage licenses to any
couples”).
12. See Civil Minutes-General at 2, Miller, No. 0:15-cv-00044-DLB (E.D. Ky. Sept. 3,
2015), ECF No. 75, http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PB-KY-0006-0010.pdf
[http://perma.cc/KK4M-2VGS]. For additional details concerning the timeline of this ongoing
legal controversy, see Ruth Colker, Religious Accommodation for County Clerks?, 76 OHIO ST.
L.J. FURTHERMORE 87 (2015), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2015/10/Vol.76-87-101-Colker-SCR-Essay.pdf [http://perma.cc/REB6-DDQL]; Jeffrey B. Hammond, Kim
Davis and the Quest for a Judicial Accommodation, 7 FAULKNER L. REV. 105 (2015).
13. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 11.
14. See Order, Miller, No. 15-cv-00044-DLB (E.D. Ky. Aug. 26, 2015), ECF No. 28-1,
http://www.aclu-ky.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/028-1-Order-Denying-Motion-to-Stay.pdf
[http://perma.cc/943S-6C87].
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issue marriage licenses. As a result, she was jailed for five days in September
2015 for contempt of court. However, Davis was then released when the
federal judge overseeing the situation was able to secure assurances that others
in Davis’ office would issue marriage licenses to all legally entitled to them. 16
Nonetheless, Davis quickly found herself again in the midst of controversy,
and again under legal fire from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
as a result of accusations that she was tampering with what had been the
standard template for Rowan County-issued marriage licenses. 17 Ultimately,
after many other legal twists and turns, this controversy appears to have been
at least temporarily resolved by the election, in late-2015, of a new
(Republican) Governor of Kentucky, Matt Bevin, who issued an executive
order soon after taking office altering Kentucky’s marriage licenses to omit
any requirements that county clerks (like Kim Davis) affix their personal
names to these licenses. 18 And then, in early-2016, Governor Bevin signed into
law a bill passed by the Kentucky legislature making changes to Kentucky
marriage licenses along the lines of Bevin’s earlier executive order. 19
In several ways, the emerging constitutional and legal concern with paper
forms in the domain of religion-state relations is surprising, and calls out for

15. See Order in Pending Case, Miller, 15-cv-00044-DLB (E.D. Ky. Aug. 31, 2015),
http://www.aclu-ky.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/SCOTUS-ruling-83115.pdf [https://perma.
cc/DK2L-NR9T].
16. See Order, Miller, 15-cv-00044-DLB (E.D. Ky. Sept. 8, 2015), ECF No. 89,
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PB-KY-0006-0011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SD8UXWMS].
17. See Motion to Enforce September 3 and September 8 Orders, supra note 1, at 8.
Specifically, in this latest round of litigation in Miller v. Davis, the ACLU (representing Miller)
alleged that, after her release from jail, Kim Davis
[c]onfiscated all the original [Rowan County marriage license] forms, and provided a
changed form which deletes all mentions of the County, fills in one of the blanks that
would otherwise be the County with the Court’s styling, deletes her name, deletes all of
the deputy clerk references, and in place of deputy clerk types in the name of [Rowan
Country Deputy Clerk] Brian Mason, and has him initial rather than sign.
Id. Moreover, the ACLU’s motion went on to describe how
Davis made substantial and material alterations to the forms that include forcing [Rowan
County Deputy Clerk Brian] Mason to issue the licenses as a “notary public” rather than a
Deputy Clerk, eliminating any mention of the County, and changing the forms to state
instead that they are issued “Pursuant to Federal Court Order #15-CV-44 DLB.”
Id.
18. See Eyder Peralta, Per Governor’s Order, Kentucky Marriage Licenses No Longer Need
Clerk’s Name, NPR (Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/12/23/46079
0418/per-governors-order-kentucky-marriage-licenses-no-longer-need-clerks-name [http://perma
.cc/RZZ3-7YYV].
19. See Bruce Schreiner, Kentucky Governor Signs Off on Single Marriage License Form,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 13, 2016), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/7447b8cfe59f4de89adf7a1c2a
298b35/kentucky-governor-signs-single-marriage-license-form [http://perma.cc/R6S4-XS4U].
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exploration and explanation. 20 For example, one might wonder how it is that
the United States Supreme Court has, post-Hobby Lobby, tasked itself with the
low-level task of drafting bureaucratic forms for the Executive Branch. 21
Similarly, one might also wonder how it is that the federal judiciary, as a
whole, has been both drawn into and possibly seduced by efforts to subject
state marriage license forms to heightened scrutiny in order to head off Kim
Davis-inspired subversions of same-sex marriage rights. 22 Indeed,
fundamentally, the federal judiciary’s emerging concerns with form and paper
in these arenas are mysteriously far removed from the pomp and circumstance
usually accompanying the high judicial art of pronouncing on rights and
justice.
This Article aims to account for the emerging constitutional and legal
concern with paper forms, especially in the context of marriage rights in the
United States. 23 The goal of this Article’s exploration of “formal marriage” is

20. Jeffrey Hammond has recognized a link between the post-Hobby Lobby and postObergefell “formal” disputes as well. See Hammond, supra note 12, at 114. As the discussion
below will make clear, however, our analyses of these situations—and, in particular, the Kim
Davis controversy—is quite different.
21. This is a point made too by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, dissenting in Wheaton College v.
Burwell, a companion case to Hobby Lobby. Wheaton College concerned a federal district court’s
refusal to issue a preliminary injunction forbidding the federal government from forcing the
plaintiff to declare its religious objections to providing contraceptive coverage under the
Affordable Care Act via the federal Employee Benefits Security Administration’s “Form 700.”
The plaintiff in this case had brought suit asking for a declaration that this bureaucratic Form 700
filing requirement violated the plaintiff’s rights according to the terms of RFRA. Chastising the
Supreme Court majority’s decision to overrule the federal district court’s refusal to issue an
injunction pending this district court’s final decision on the merits of the plaintiff’s RFRA claim,
Sotomayor wrote: “Stepping into the shoes of [the Department of Health and Human Services],
the [majority on the] Court sets out to craft a new administrative regime . . . . This Court has no
business rewriting administrative regulations. Yet, without pause, the Court essentially does just
that.” Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2814 (2014).
22. See, e.g., Motion to Enforce September 3 and September 8 Orders, supra note 1, at 8.
See also Stephen Young, Denton JP’s Plan for Same-Sex Weddings: Make Them Unpleasant,
DALLAS OBSERVER (July 13, 2015), http://www.dallasobserver.com/news/denton-jps-plan-forsame-sex-weddings-make-them-unpleasant-7388916 [http://perma.cc/7W78-XME3]; Marriage
Declaration Ceremony, DENTON COUNTY, TEX., http://dentoncounty.com/Departments/Justiceof-Peace-Pcts/Justice-of-the-Peace-Precinct2/Marriage-Ceremonies.aspx [http://perma.cc/4PRPT33K] (last visited Sept. 1, 2016); Acknowledgment Form, DENTON COUNTY, TEX., http://denton
county.com/~/media/Departments/Justice-of-Peace-Pcts/Justice-of-the-Peace-Precinct2/PDF/
Wedding-Letter-and-receipt_2015_07.pdf [http://perma.cc/84DP-FVN5].
23. This Article largely focuses on the post-Obergefell controversies concerning marriage
certificates, and not the post-Hobby Lobby controversies concerning the securing of exemptions
from federal government-mandated contraceptive coverage. However, as this very introduction
suggests, these two controversies are related not only in time but also in the fact that they both
largely concern paper forms. Moreover, as the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ recent decision in
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015), suggests,
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twofold, namely to explain how it is that marriage rights in the United States
have suddenly become a matter of form-al dispute and, relatedly, to elucidate
what—besides paper, stamps, and signatures—is represented in these new
controversies concerning marriage formalities. The key explanation that this
Article offers for this formal turn in marriage disputing is dependent on a
reframing of marriage rights, seeing in these rights less an understanding of
(and dispute about) marriage as dignity but, instead, marriage as money. And
if marriage is money, then one can begin to understand how Kim Davis’
marriage licenses have become of central importance to key monetary actors
including, notably, the federal government. Or so this Article will suggest.
This Article’s arguments and discussions build off of previous work of
mine on the law and politics of same-sex marriage in the United States. 24 It
also builds off of a long tradition, by a wide variety of scholars and activists, of
analyzing the material implications of marriage. 25 Here, however, the focus is

these two lines of controversies can become interlinked in certain factual scenarios. In this
respect, the Tenth Circuit observed in its majority opinion that Utah state laws which allow a
same-sex marriage-opposing county clerk to seek exemption from the (new) United States
constitutional mandate that all states (and their agents) marry same-sex couples raise issues
parallel to those at issue in Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged and that case’s
religiously-motivated protagonist’s efforts to seek exemption from federal mandates to provide
contraceptive-inclusive health care insurance coverage. See id. at 1183, n.31.
24. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Redding, Dignity, Legal Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage, 75
BROOK. L. REV. 791 (2010); Jeffrey A. Redding, Querying Edith Windsor, Querying Equality, 59
VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE. 9 (2013); Jeffrey A. Redding, Marriage ≠ Marriage: Querying the
Relevance of Equality to the Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships, 69 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 117 (2014).
25. See, e.g., RALPH RICHARD BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE?: HOW THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN MARRIAGE DECLINE AFFECTS EVERYONE 27 (2011) (positing that “[i]f
marriage is less a necessity and more . . . a luxury, then it takes money. It is something that
people do after they’ve established a measure of stability and reached other milestones. A job, a
house, a car—these all typically come before marriage now. And if those goals are not
accomplished, then often neither is marriage.”); Adrienne Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy,
Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2041 (2010) (noting that
“[m]arriage is not only a licensing but also a distributive justice scheme. As currently structured,
it discriminates between intimates, channeling resources, preferences, and subsidies to those it
recognizes and not others. Importantly, marriage also allocates resources between intimates.
During marriage and after, at death or divorce, rules establish baseline entitlements, determining
rights and duties, many of them economic.”); Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging
the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 82 (2001) (arguing that “since
much of the legal intervention in intimate relationships is related to financial issues, such as
dividing debt, assets, and income when a relationship ends, models tailored to solve financial
problems are well suited to address family law problems”); Janet E. Halley, What Is Family
Law?: Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE L.J. 1, 1 (2011) (developing a critical perspective on how
“Domestic Relations/Family Law are what they are by virtue of their [historical] categorical
distinction from the law of contract and, more broadly, the law of the market” and “suggest[ing]
that family law should be restructured to connect it for the first time to domains of law more
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on “the material of the material” or, put another way, the (physical) currencylike qualities of marriage licenses (and certificates). Viewing marriage licenses
as money allows us to see Kim Davis’ alteration of pieces of paper that
individuals can use for tax benefits, employment privileges, and economically
valuable social connections—in short, Kim Davis’ alteration of marriage
licenses—as akin to the mutilation of money. In the contemporary moment, it
is often forgotten that, at the time of the United States Constitution’s original
framing, the drafters of the Constitution were deeply concerned with restricting
states’ authority to “coin Money” 26 or “emit Bills of Credit.” 27 Or, as the late
scholar James Willard Hurst put it, “the federal Constitution showed strong
distrust of allowing state legislatures to set money-supply policy.” 28 Yet states
regularly emit valuable marriage licenses and certificates, possessing key
attributes of money. Given this paradoxical reality, a central federal concern
begins to emerge: these state-backed coins 29 and bills—these state marriage
documents—must be federally regulated. Indeed, their regulation would seem
to be of fundamental importance to a federal system concerned with
maintaining its supremacy in ordering the economic affairs of the nation. And
hence the federal judiciary’s concern with Kim Davis’ Rowan County,
Kentucky marriage licenses.
Paper forms have provided the text and subtext of many important
developments in legal doctrine and practice in the United States. This has been
especially obvious in the domain of United States civil procedure. For
example, the United States Supreme Court decisions in Bell Atlantic v.

readily understood to relate directly to the market: economically significant productivity, social
security provision, and the fair or unfair distribution of economic resources”); Yasmin Nair,
Against Marriage, Against Equality: An Introduction, in AGAINST EQUALITY: QUEER CRITIQUES
OF GAY MARRIAGE 18 (Ryan Conrad ed., 2010) (describing marriage as “the neoliberal state’s
most efficient way to corral the family as a source of revenue and to place upon it the ultimate
responsibility for guaranteeing basic benefits like health care”); Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways
to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227, 1227–28 (2005) (noting how
“proponents of same-sex marriage have highlighted the dignity and social acceptance that flow
from the states’ recognition of sexual relationships . . . [b]ut [that] access to the institution of
marriage is just the beginning [given that o]nce married, spouses receive tax, social security, and
family-related benefits that are unavailable to nonmarried individuals”).
26. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10.
27. Id.
28. HURST, supra note 2, at 8.
29. I use this term in the spirit of the United States Constitution’s concerns with restricting
states’ ability to “coin Money.” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10. I also use this term mindful of Robert
Natelson’s arguments that the Constitution’s coinage language should not be exclusively
understood according to contemporary understandings of what it means to “coin.” Rather,
historically, “money . . . ‘coined’ did not need to be metallic. Paper or any other material . . .
would suffice.” Robert G. Natelson, Paper Money and the Original Understanding of the
Coinage Clause, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1017, 1079 (2008).
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Twombly 30 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal 31 instigated intense debate concerning the
proper interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (concerning
pleading), and the viability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s pleading
forms and templates. 32 Similarly, the precise parameters of the United States
Supreme Court’s confusing Erie doctrine are at least somewhat motivated by
the Court’s concern to maintain the constitutional viability of the federal
judiciary’s paper practices. 33
30. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
31. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
32. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) tells a plaintiff in the federal civil system that they
must include statements as to the following three issues in any complaint they file in federal
court: (1) a statement of the federal court’s power (i.e. jurisdiction) to hear the case, (2) the actual
nature of the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant, and (3) what kind of remedy (e.g.
monetary compensation) the plaintiff wants from the defendant. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1)–(3).
These three components of a complaint are fundamental to its validity and viability, but
are also relatively basic. Indeed, given the kinds of recitations that Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 8(a) often gave rise to, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure developed template-like
forms that plaintiffs could fill out to initiate a civil case in federal court. Form 11 in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure’s Appendix of Forms, for example, used to give plaintiffs a basic “fillin-the-blank” form to use when initiating a negligence action in federal district court.
Relatively recent United States Supreme Court jurisprudence—in particular, the notable
cases of Twombly and Iqbal—has suggested, however, that a plaintiff must avoid filing relatively
cursory, template-like complaints for fear of not being able to convince a federal district court
judge that the plaintiff’s claims rise to the requisite level of being “plausible” rather than merely
“conceivable.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 687. Moreover, even more
recent changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have eliminated the Rules’ pleading forms
altogether. See Letter from John G. Roberts, Chief Justice, to John A. Boehner, House Speaker
(Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv15_5h25.pdf [http://perma.
cc/7LLR-N56Z].
33. The name of this doctrine comes from the eponymous case of Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Erie doctrine works to discourage forum shopping between
state and federal courts in some cases (namely, “diversity” cases) where these different kinds of
courts share jurisdiction. See generally U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2 (declaring that “[t]he [federal]
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . between Citizens of different States”); 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(1) (2012) (declaring “[t]he [federal] district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is
between . . . citizens of different States”). The Erie doctrine has this discouraging effect by
directing federal district courts to (broadly speaking) apply the same law as would be applied in
the relevant state court. As the Supreme Court has described the Erie doctrine’s intent elsewhere:
this doctrine should ensure that a plaintiff’s choice of federal versus state court is not “outcome
determinative.” See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (explaining that “[Erie]
expressed a policy that touches vitally the proper distribution of judicial power between State and
federal courts. In essence, the intent of that decision was to insure that . . . the outcome of the
litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the
outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court”).
Yet all sorts of different legal rules pervade the operation of federal and state civil courts,
and affect outcomes. Amongst these differences are differences in procedural norms (e.g. what
must be said in a pleading) and, also, very basic filing requirements—often understood as “local
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If paper has been a central concern of United States legal procedure, it is
now also a fundamental concern of the substantive area of state-religion
relations. This Article aims to account for the rise of these new formal
concerns, especially as marriage has vividly taken center-stage in the
continuing United States tug-of-war between religion and state. Towards this
goal, Part I of this Article will examine the material aspects of marriage
present in recent United States constitutional debates concerning same-sex
marriage. As “dignity” has become the dominant frame through which the
United States Supreme Court (majority) has recently understood and extended
marriage rights to same-sex couples in the United States, this framing has
obscured the material benefits accruing in and incentivizing marriage. Part II
turns resolutely away from obfuscatory marital framings and explicitly to
money, briefly explicating the complicated history of money (and particularly,
currency) in the United States. One important goal of this Part is to
demonstrate the plural forms that money and currency have taken historically
in the United States, thus setting the stage for a consideration of how marriage
licenses can be considered money—not just along the lines of Part I’s
arguments, but also in these licenses’ paper materiality. Part III then explicitly
connects the discussions in Parts I and II, demonstrating how the recent federal
concern with Kim Davis’ marriage forms can be seen as just the latest chapter
in the controversial story of money in the United States, whether that money be
cold hard cash—or marriage.
I. MATERIAL DIMENSIONS TO LEGAL MARRIAGE
In previous work of mine, I have worked to challenge the articulation and
use of simplistic ideas of “dignity” in legal and political debates concerning
same-sex marriage. In particular, I have suggested that arguments for same-sex
marriage rights premised on an idea of “gay dignity” have been problematic to
the extent that these dignity arguments did not simultaneously recognize the
need for robust “gay agency” vis-à-vis the political and legal development of—

rules.” See generally Samuel P. Jordan, Local Rules and the Limits of Trans-Territorial
Procedure, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415 (2010) (describing a wide variety of local variations on
ostensibly national federal civil procedure rules and norms). Any given court’s local rules can be
detailed and numerous, covering aspects of filing not covered by either the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or a given state’s equivalent code. And one common local rule concerns the size of the
paper on which a claim must be filed. For example, Local Rule 5-2.01 for the federal Eastern
District of Missouri states (in part): “All filings, unless otherwise permitted by leave of Court,
shall be double spaced typed or legibly written on 8 ½ by 11 inch pages.” E.D. Mo. L.R. 52.01(A)(1). As a result, the United States Supreme Court has endeavored to shape the parameters
of the Erie doctrine to ensure that outcome-determinative paper-size rules are not contemplated in
the application of this doctrine. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (disavowing
the relevance of, for the Erie doctrine, “nonsubstantial, or trivial, variations” between federal and
state law).
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historically heterosexual and otherwise majoritarian—marital norms. 34
However, if anything, the problematic deployment of simplistic “gay dignity”
arguments—made by LGB folk and marriage-loving “straight allies” alike—
only accelerated in the lead up to the Supreme Court’s recent Obergefell
decision on same-sex marriage. This acceleration culminated in the Obergefell
majority opinion itself, where Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the
majority, went so far as to describe the essential plea posed by the gay and
lesbian plaintiffs in this case 35 in the following manner: “Their hope is not to
be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization’s oldest
institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law.” 36
The “dignified” plaintiffs in this case presented familiar cases of sympathy
and respectability—one plaintiff’s partner had died from a tragic medical
condition, another plaintiff-couple were mothers raising multiple children, and
yet another plaintiff had deployed to Afghanistan to “serve[] this Nation to
preserve the freedom the Constitution protects” 37—making them ready
candidates for Justice Kennedy’s bestowment of dignity rights. Yet the
contemporary 38 (over-) framing of marriage rites as dignity rights obscures
other equally salient aspects of marriage and the law regulating it. Indeed,
while some people marry exclusively for the dignity they associate with being
married, other people more quickly see the material benefits coming with
marital status. 39 In short, framing marriage rights as exclusively about dignity

34. See generally Redding, Dignity, Legal Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage, supra note
24.
35. This Supreme Court case was a consolidated appeal of separate cases emanating from
different states—specifically, Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee—located in the federal
Sixth Circuit. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
36. Id. at 2608 (emphasis added). Kennedy invoked the notion of dignity in many other parts
of his majority opinion as well. See, e.g., id. at 2594; id. at 2595.
37. See id. at 2594–95.
38. By way of contrast, see Michael Boucai, Glorious Precedents: When Gay Marriage Was
Radical, 27 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2015). Focusing on mid-twentieth century United States
litigation concerning gay marriage rights, Boucai notes how
[M]arriage litigation in the wake of Stonewall had much more to do with gay liberation
generally than with gay marriage specifically . . . . Indeed, the Baker, Jones, and Singer
cases deployed the symbolism of marriage to proclaim homosexuality’s equality, legal
and moral, in a society that almost ubiquitously criminalized its practice. They vividly
protested the traditional gender roles that gay liberationists located at the heart of their
oppression and that marriage, at the time, not only fostered but legally prescribed. They
provided a platform from which to critique other aspects of marriage, such as the rule of
monogamy and the state’s coercive, intrusive preference for a particular form of intimate
association. And perhaps most importantly, these cases were sensational advertisements
of gay people, gay relationships, and the nascent gay liberation movement.
Id. at 4–5.
39. Including the material benefits that may accrue (indirectly) through the social stature that
marriage bestows in certain contexts.
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rights often obscures marriage’s material dimensions or, put another way, its
“money” aspects.
Such a material/money dimension to marriage was not entirely absent in
the Obergefell opinion. For example, discussing the relevance of marriage to
childrearing, Kennedy’s majority opinion first noted that “[u]nder the laws of
the several States, some of marriage’s protections for children and families are
material,” before emphasizing that “marriage also confers more profound
benefits.” 40 More generally, Kennedy also discussed that “while the States are
in general free to vary the benefits they confer on all married couples, they
have throughout our history made marriage the basis for an expanding list of
governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities.” 41 This list included,
according to Kennedy, matters pertaining to “taxation; inheritance and
property rights; rules of intestate succession; spousal privilege in the law of
evidence; hospital access; medical decisionmaking authority; adoption rights;
the rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death certificates; . . . workers’
compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody, support, and
visitation rules.” 42
With this latter list, Kennedy lists numerous explicitly material benefits to
marriage, yet also weaves a tight tapestry of money and affect. Indeed, as
much as custodial rights to children can be deeply emotionally rewarding,
these children can also be very expensive. For Kennedy, however, this material
point is not one to highlight. To get a much sharper view of the material
aspects to marriage (and its kinship-oriented cognates), one has to turn to
United States v. Windsor, 43 the Supreme Court’s stepping stone to Obergefell.
In this case, the plaintiff, Edith Windsor, sued the United States federal
government for its refusal to recognize Windsor’s same-sex spouse, Thea
Spyer, as Windsor’s marital partner for federal taxation purposes. Windsor and
Spyer had wed in Canada in 2007, and the State of New York had
subsequently recognized their Canadian marriage. 44 As for federal government
recognition, however, Section 3 of the then-viable federal Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA) directed all parts of the federal government to take note that
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies
of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers
45
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.
Id. at 2601.
Id.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
Id. at 2682.
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
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As a result, when Thea Spyer died in early 2009, her and Edith Windsor’s
marriage was not recognized by the United States federal government for
federal taxation purposes. In particular, the Internal Revenue Service refused to
consider Edith Windsor as Thea Spyer’s spouse for the purposes of the marital
exemption to the federal estate tax. The resulting federal tax bill for Edith
Windsor was significant, namely to the tune of $363,053. 46
A material context and pretext for same-sex marriage rights in the United
States is brought out not only by the facts that led to United States v. Windsor,
but also the reasoning embodied in Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority
opinion in this case. 47 Quite vividly, Kennedy’s opinion is a testament to elite
values and material interests underlying contemporary marriage. For example,
Kennedy laments how DOMA “divests married same-sex couples of the duties
and responsibilities that are an essential part of married life.” 48 However, one
example of “marital essentialities” that Kennedy provides, and which DOMA
allegedly divests same-sex married couples of, is a prohibition—as a
recognized “spouse” of a Senator—“from accepting high-value gifts from
certain sources.” 49 Yet another example was DOMA’s immunization of samesex married couples from a requirement—as a recognized “spouse” of any one
of “numerous high-ranking [federal] officials” 50—to make extensive and
burdensome official filings as to one’s financial situation. In short, in this case,
it seems that the injustices of marriage discrimination are embodied in Edith
Windsor’s tax problems. Moreover, it seems, for Justice Kennedy at least, that
these grave injustices would be only more manifold if Mrs. Windsor were
Senator Windsor.
As Obergefell—and, even moreso, Windsor—reveal then, a marriage
license is a piece of paper that can ultimately be used for cash and other
material benefits. In short, it is a paper form that has value. And as with other
pieces of paper that have value, there is bound to be intense interest in
regulating its issuance—both in terms of how much of this valuable paper is
issued, as well as ensuring that counterfeiters are not able to introduce “fake”
versions of this valuable paper. Viewed this way, we can then begin to see the
federal legal system’s tussle with Kim Davis over her issuance of “faulty
marriage certificates” as a replay of earlier historical struggles between the
federal government and states (as well as private actors) over who has
authority over money. Yet before we can get to that argument, we need to
understand what “money” is—or can be—including the multitudinous forms it

46. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
47. For additional critique of this majority opinion, see Redding, Querying Edith Windsor,
Querying Equality, supra note 24.
48. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695 (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. Id.
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has taken historically and also contemporarily. The next Part thus turns to a
brief exposition of the incredibly rich and multidimensional history of money
in the United States.
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF UNITED STATES MONEY
A money-using economy may experience widely different stages of monetary
control: (1) No control at all; that is, a policy of complete laissez-faire with
respect to money. (2) A metallic standard system in which the government
legislates the legal tender value of the unit of account in terms of a precious
metal but lets private coin-smiths produce the prescribed coins. (3) The same
system, but one in which the government monopolizes the coinage of the
monetary metals. (4) A metallic standard system, such as (3), on which is
superimposed a central-banking institution that is strictly limited to short-run,
seasonal policies. Finally, (5) a central bank standing by itself with complete
discretionary control over the supply of money entering the economic system.
—Richard H. Timberlake
Monetary Policy in the United States:
51
An Intellectual and Institutional History

Richard Timberlake’s ideas as to the developmental stages of money and
monetary policy are compelling, not so much for any universalistic paradigm
of “progress” that they set up, but for what they reveal about the historical—
and ongoing—messiness of money. Indeed, what constitutes money, especially
in the United States, has been subject to a great deal of historical controversy, 52
as well as a great deal of experimentation. While the legal and financial status
of Bitcoin is, in many ways, the monetary controversy of the day, 53 this “peerto-peer currency with no central bank, based on digital tokens with no intrinsic
value” 54 provides just the latest wrinkle in the United States’ (and world’s)
historical experimentations with what constitutes money. Moreover, these
monetary experimentations—and the tensions between different kinds of

51. RICHARD H. TIMBERLAKE, MONETARY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
INTELLECTUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 235 (1978).
52. James Willard Hurst, in his magisterial work on the legal history of money in the United
States describes “money” in a functional sense. According to Hurst, the usual historical purposes
of money in the United States—whatever specific form money took at a particular time—have
multitudinously been “to serve as a formal measure of economic values, to serve as a medium of
exchange in economic transactions, to serve as a device to hold in suspension the ability to
command more specific assets for specific economic uses . . . and to serve as a standard of
deferred payments.” HURST, supra note 2, at 30. It is worth emphasizing that Hurst’s definition of
“money” here still allows for this money to take a wide variety of forms.
53. See, e.g., Bitcoin Under Pressure, ECONOMIST (Nov. 30, 2013), http://www.economist.
com/news/technology-quarterly/21590766-virtual-currency-it-mathematically-elegant-increas
ingly-popular-and-highly [http://perma.cc/8C5Z-9R4R].
54. Id.
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private- and public-control of money that they bear witness to—have strong
parallels to historical and ongoing experimentations concerning marriage in the
United States. This Part provides a brief history of money in the United States;
the next Part links this discussion to marriage.
As to the rich history of money in the Unites States, it is worth noting from
the outset that the Federal Reserve notes that seem so familiar to Americans
(and others) today are a relatively late monetary development—dating from the
mid-nineteenth century in their inception but only achieving their current
legitimacy and status later. 55 Before then, as the late-scholar Arthur
Nussbaum 56 so exhaustively documented, all sorts of items circulated in the
early colonial period as “media of payment,” 57 including “corn and beaver
skins and, in the [American] South, tobacco and rice.” 58 In some instances,
colonial settlers also adopted Native American forms of money, namely
“wampum” beads (made of shells). As to wampum, according to Nussbaum,
“Massachusetts elevated wampum to the status of legal tender in 1643. Other
colonies followed suit, and in New York wampum remained legal tender until
1701. In frontier districts it is said to have been used until the early nineteenth
century.” 59 Where more contemporarily recognizable objects—such as coins—
circulated in what would later become the United States, they were not
necessarily coins of the different North American colonies, or even British
ones, but often enough Spanish ones. 60 Indeed, unsurprisingly, because of the
prevalence of foreign coin during the colonial period, the Constitution of the
newly formed United States included a provision giving Congress the authority
to “regulate the value . . . of foreign coin.” 61
Paper money was a relative latecomer to the United States—reportedly this
kind of money was first invented by the Chinese during the tenth century 62—
and its development from a relatively amateurish form to the present day,
highly regularized Federal Reserve note was a long one. The colony of
Massachusetts appears to have been the first innovator of paper money in

55. See discussion accompanying infra notes 73–86.
56. See generally ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A HISTORY OF THE DOLLAR (1957).
57. Id. at 3.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 6–7.
60. As Nussbaum describes the pre-Independence colonial money situation: “Strangely
enough, separation from England started in the monetary field.” Id. at 11.
61. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8. See also NUSSBAUM, supra note 56, for a description of how
Congress, in 1806, renewed the legal tender status of the Spanish dollar and also extended this
status to certain French coins. It was only in 1857 that Congress finally legislated an end to the
legal tender status, in the United States, of foreign coins. Id. at 84.
62. NUSSBAUM, supra note 56, at 15.
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North America, printing “Bills of Credit” as early as 1690.63 Initially, these
government-issued bills could only be used in repaying debts owed to the
government but, later, they were also made legally sufficient for payments (for
goods or debts) between private individuals. 64 The first nationally-issued paper
money would have to wait for almost another 100 years when the Continental
Congress in 1775, desperate for a means to raise money for its war of
revolutionary insurrection against the British, started to issue paper bills of
credit—later popularly known as “continentals”—“entitl[ing] the Bearer to
receive three Spanish milled dollars.” 65
However, this proto-Congress did not itself have the legal authority to
force individuals to accept continentals as payment in their day-to-day
financial transactions with other individuals. 66 This authority belonged to the
subsidiary colonies (and then, later, states), who did exercise it—at least for
several years until the continental radically deflated in value and the newlyindependent states began issuing their own currencies. 67 Later, in the early
nineteenth century, after the recently-drafted United States Constitution
forbade states from “emit[ting] bills of credit,” 68 states evaded this prohibition
by simply chartering private banks. These banks issued—often
irresponsibly 69—their own private notes; these private notes circulated
publicly as currency. Indeed, even though people often understood the
unreliability of the bank reserves underwriting these circulating notes, that did
not mean the notes had no value. Writes Nussbaum: “People [just] accepted
them at varying discounts.” 70 An altogether different source of currency also
arose during this time with the creation of “shinplasters”—namely, small slips
of paper of credit issued by all sorts of public and private entities as change for
small-value transactions where no small-denomination bills or coins were
available. 71 With this proliferation of banks and bank notes—the scholar A.

63. Id. at 14. According to Nussbaum, paper money did not come to England itself until
1729. Id. at 15.
64. See id. at 14–15.
65. Id. at 35–36.
66. Id. at 36.
67. NUSSBAUM, supra note 56, at 36–42.
68. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10.
69. Nussbaum notes that, during this time, “banking was thought of as a highly speculative
enterprise with little responsibility. . . . Loans were commonly paid out by the banks in their own
notes without giving much thought to specie or other reserves.” NUSSBAUM, supra note 56, at 64.
70. Id. at 65.
71. See id. at 66 (describing how, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, “paper money
of small denominations was issued by municipalities, by bridge and turnpike companies, and by
other enterprises. Commonly called ‘scrips’ or ‘shinplasters,’ they were given and accepted in
payment by the issuer and as circulating media by the people.”); see id. at 113 (describing the
Civil War period when shinplasters were “issued mostly by hotels and transportation companies,
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Barton Hepburn found that “there were [approximately] 7000 kinds and
denominations of notes, and fully 4000 spurious or altered varieties” 72 in
circulation in the United States right before the beginning of the Civil War—
the monetary situation became extremely pluralistic during this time.
While this pluralistic situation would not change overnight, it was
dramatically influenced by the advent of the Civil War. Suddenly confronted
with the need to finance escalating wartime expenditures, Congress authorized
the issuance of what became known as “greenbacks” 73—the forerunner of the
Federal Reserve notes so widely known and used today. 74 As Richard
Timberlake described this dramatic domestic dollar development, “[t]he new
issues of greenbacks were unprecedented in that they were full legal tender for
all debts public and private. . . . In addition, the quantities issued were massive
compared to the earlier issues of treasury notes.” 75
Given the radical nature of the greenback, it is not surprising that the legal
and constitutional validity of this monetary device would soon be put to test.
Ultimately, indeed, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide different
disputes, arising in different states, concerning the issuance and validity of the
greenback as a form of payment.
One of the more important of these disputes emanated, ironically enough,
from Kentucky. 76 In Kentucky, and elsewhere—especially in the West—
“many creditors . . . refused to accept the depreciated greenbacks on
constitutional grounds” 77 when “debtors started to offer large amounts of
greenbacks in payments of their debts, acceptance of which would have meant
heavy losses to the creditors.” 78 The State of Kentucky’s appellate-level Court
of Errors, in an outlier decision disagreeing with sixteen other states’ high

but also by barber shops, drug stores, etc.”); see also TIMBERLAKE, supra note 51, at 122
(discussing the shinplaster situation during and after the 1861–65 Civil War period).
72. A. BARTON HEPBURN, A HISTORY OF CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES 180 (1924)
(quoted in RICHARD H. TIMBERLAKE, MONETARY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
INTELLECTUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 84 (1978)). It is not clear whether these tallies
include shinplasters.
73. See TIMBERLAKE, supra note 51, at 85.
74. The formal debut of the modern “Federal Reserve note” had to, unsurprisingly, await the
actual creation of the Federal Reserve system in 1913. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 56, at 159–62
for more discussion of this important monetary system development.
75. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 51, at 85–86. Nussbaum notes that greenbacks (or, “United
States notes,” as they were more officially known) did have one limitation on their use: they
could not be used to pay United States customs dues. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 56, at 101.
76. Earlier in the century, Kentucky had also been the site of another major constitutional
dispute concerning federal versus state monetary authority. See id. at 75–76; HURST, supra note
2, at 140–41.
77. NUSSBAUM, supra note 56, at 118.
78. Id. at 116–17.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2016]

FORMAL MARRIAGE

687

court decisions, 79 ruled that federal laws pertaining to the greenbacks’ legal
tender status were not binding on creditor-debtor contracts in that state which
came into force before the legislation of these federal laws. Ultimately, the
United States Supreme Court, in a closely split decision, agreed with
Kentucky, in the landmark decision of Hepburn v. Griswold. 80
Subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court were, however, far more
solicitous of the federal government’s interests and desires. Importantly, in a
combined hearing of one case emanating from Texas, Knox v. Lee, and another
case from Massachusetts, Parker v. Davis, the United States Supreme Court—
in an opinion that came to be known, simply, as The Legal Tender Cases 81—
declared that Congress had the constitutional power to issue greenbacks and
make them legal tender for all debts public and private. The foundations for
this opinion were broadened and deepened in yet another case on this topic,
Juilliard v. Greenman, 82 decided over a decade later, in 1884.
These late-nineteenth century developments marked a significant point of
departure from the previous monetary situation in the United States. For the
first time, the United States had a currency issued by the federal government
intentionally designed and designated as legal tender by the federal
government for (nearly 83) all domestic transactions—no matter between
whom. 84 Moreover, as the United States’ international economic and political
stature grew in the late nineteenth century, the United States dollar even
became legal tender outside of the United States—most notably in Canada,
Mexico, and even briefly in Switzerland. 85 Simultaneously, private state bank
notes in the United States eventually disappeared as the federal government
taxed them out of existence. 86
Yet in all of the modern United States dollar’s widespread acceptability,
important limitations to—and aspects of—other kinds of money are revealed.
Put another way, the ambitious reach of the late nineteenth century United
States dollar is an indication of the relative uniqueness of this currency, and
how other forms of money can and do operate in more limited fashions. For
example, in the Federal Reserve note’s declaration of validity for “all debts
public and private” a distinction between public and private debts is erased—
but also revealed. Before the advent of the greenback, the federal government

79. See id. at 118.
80. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1870).
81. The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 (1871).
82. Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884).
83. See discussion supra note 75.
84. For discussion of an earlier (but different) example of a United States government-issued
currency, see NUSSBAUM, supra note 56, at 70–71.
85. See id. at 152. Nussbaum notes how this foreign acceptance of United States currency
“was a kind of reversal of the part played in earlier times by foreign coins in this country.” Id.
86. See id. at 110–12.
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had, from time to time, issued notes that could be used by individuals for
repayment of debts (for example, taxes) owed to the federal government—
public debts, in other words. 87 And for a much longer period of time, private
individuals had developed forms of money to use between themselves for
goods and (private) debt payments. One way of understanding these two
different monetary situations, then, is to see the former as involving “vertical
money” and the latter “horizontal money.” Seen this way, the “innovation” of
the greenback then was that it was a government-issued currency that was
simultaneously both a vertical and horizontal money.
A related point also emerges here: not all “money” is universally
acceptable. In many ways, this is an obvious point, for not even in our
currently highly globalized world and economy is any money—not even the
United States dollar—fully transferrable or universally accepted. For example,
the United States dollar does not fully work as a money outside United States
borders, even if it is the case—as a 2006 report by the federal government
documents—that more than fifty percent of the extant United States currency
in existence circulates outside of the United States.88 Something similar can be
said of the euro, the ruble, and the renminbi; each has an “economy” in which
it is legal tender. Moreover, as the previous discussion of vertical and
horizontal monies suggests, even within a particular (national) economy, not
every kind of money is intended to be fully exchangeable in every which way.
These transferability, exchangeability, and recognition issues, in turn,
suggest parallels between (paper) money and (paper) marriage. In particular, as
with many currencies, marriage certificates are backed by particular
sovereigns. Yet, for many people, in order for these certificates to be fully
useful, they need to be able to cross borders. For example, a couple married in
Massachusetts, and relocating to Alabama, will often enough ask for Alabama
to recognize this couple’s (Massachusetts) marriage in order for this couple to
receive a comparable basket of marital goods in Alabama as this couple did in
Massachusetts. The next Part turns to these and other parallels between
marriage and money.

87. See, e.g., id. at 70–71, 86–87.
88. Specifically, this 2006 federal government report found that “$450 billion of the $760
billion in circulation as of December 2005, is now held abroad.” The Use and Counterfeiting of
United States Currency Abroad, Part 3, Pub. L. 104-132 (Sept. 2006), http://www.treasury.gov/
about/organizational-structure/offices/Domestic-Finance/Documents/the%20use%20and%20
counterfeiting%20of%20u.s.%20currency%20abroad%20%20part%203%20september2006.pdf
[http://perma.cc/J9B4-JC98]. Some foreign countries (for example, Ecuador and El Salvador)
have officially “dollarized” their economies but, in other countries (for example, Russia), United
States currency is used informally by individuals to hedge against value instability in their local
currencies, which arise as a result of inflationary economic policies or political uncertainty. See
id. at 17–18.
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III. MARRIAGE AS MONEY
Richard Timberlake’s discussion of the developmental stages of money
and monetary policy which opened Part II is interesting not only for what it
says about the pluralistic nature of money, but also in the parallels that it
suggests between the development of monetary policy and marriage policy.
Indeed, the slow and uneven centralization of authority, in the United States,
over what counts as “money”—and also who can make it—has also arguably
transpired with respect to “marriage.” For example, private coinage can be
seen not only with respect to currency, 89 but also in the practice of commonlaw marriage. 90
While there is a great deal more that could be said about the macro
historical development (and decline) of structures of authority for both money
and marriage, the focus of this Part is on the more-micro “material of the
material.” In other words, the focus here is on the ways in which paper
marriage licenses (and certificates) resemble at least some forms of money—
or, alternatively, represent a kind of money as unique as the Federal Reserve
note itself. The further suggestion, then, is that a great deal of the recent
concern with Kim Davis’ marriage licenses is a replay of earlier (yet also
ongoing) federal concerns with regulating the supply and form of money.
Seeing that one important effort of this Part is to suggest a paper money
analogue to paper marital forms, it is worth emphasizing from the outset that
marriage licenses are only a small part of this Part’s discussions. In this
respect, if an important attribute of money (or at least currency) is that it must
be circulating in some way or another, marriage licenses themselves are not
really the operative circulating paper here; a marriage license is, as Mary Anne
Case notes, simply a license to marry (with its attendant privileges and duties)
after all. 91 More important is what the license can ultimately lead to—namely,
89. See text accompanying supra note 51; see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 56, at 84–86
(describing private coinage in the United States, which continued as late as 1901).
90. While fewer states permit the creation of common-law marriages today, the following
jurisdictions still allow them to be created: Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Montana,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah (in some circumstances), and also the
District of Columbia. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 169 (3d ed.
2012). Given that common-law marriages are created first and foremost through private
interactions, not interaction with bureaucratic state officials, one state concern here has been the
lack of control over the creation of marriage. Such a concern has not been unique to the United
States. For example, in the well-known 2002 case of Shamim Ara v. State of U.P. & Anr., AIR
2002 SC 3551 (India), the Supreme Court of India took interest in the formal attributes of any
written talaqnama—in short, a proclamation by a Muslim husband dissolving his marriage with
his wife and, in essence, a private, non-state divorce—seemingly setting the state up for final and
fine-grained review of millions of Muslim divorces and their accompanying paper documents.
91. See generally Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758 (2005)
(describing how in a “variety of ways over time and at present marriage has been seen to license
participants in the institution”). In this work of hers, Case provocatively analogizes marriage
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the marriage certificate. Hence, for the purposes of this Part’s efforts, Kim
Davis’ marriage licenses are important to the extent that they are used to get
marriage certificates. Yet this is not to say that they are completely
insignificant or irrelevant. Indeed, the controversy over Kim Davis’ marriage
licenses can be seen (at least partly) as concern over her interference with the
“marital printing press” that produces paper marriage certificates in Kentucky.
As to a convincing monetary analogue to the paper marriage certificate,
one way to see this government-issued paper is as a vertical money. Indeed,
somewhat like a state bill of credit, 92 a marriage certificate is a paper form
issued to individuals from a state government containing a value redeemed
towards debts—for example, taxes—owed by those individuals to the issuing
state government. While the marriage certificate’s statement of value may be
implicit, and not a round sum easily discernible on the face of the paper
document, this should not be considered fatal to the vertical monetary analogy
offered here. 93
One problem with this analogy is that marriage certificates are not actually
physically exchanged with issuing governments when these certificates are
used for payment/relief from taxes. For similar reasons, it is also somewhat
hard to describe paper marriage certificates as a horizontal money simpliciter.
Indeed, the fact that the marriage certificate has two specific parties’ name on
it limits the ability of either of these parties from transferring the certificate to
anyone else in exchange for goods or retirement of debt. In large part, this
limitation on exchange comes from the “worthlessness” of the certificate for
the secondary recipient because—absent a hobbyists’ (or fetishists’) market
driven by a curiosity in and commercialization of other peoples’ marriage
certificates—they themselves would find it difficult to exchange the certificate
with anyone else for anything of value. 94
Yet “private economies” composed of individual consumers and producers
are not the only kinds of horizontal economies possible nor the only kinds of
licenses to other kinds of legal licenses and forms, including dog licenses, driver’s licenses, and
corporate charters. See id. at 1765. This Article takes inspiration from Case’s work here, yet
offers another analogy altogether.
92. See discussion accompanying supra note 63.
93. As Nussbaum notes, there are complications in using interest-bearing paper notes as
currency, as a result of these notes’ value not being immediately evident from their surface
inscription. According to Nussbaum, “[r]eal money requires round sums and complete
standardization” and “[c]irculation as currency is impossible when the payer and the payee first
have to compute the interest due.” NUSSBAUM, supra note 56, at 16, 22. While Nussbaum’s broad
points as to what makes currency relatively easy (or difficult) to use are well-taken, I would resist
the distinction that he draws between “real” and “unreal” money if only because his own
historical description demonstrates a fluidity as to what people (whether in the United States or
elsewhere) have historically considered “money.”
94. It is worth noting here, however, that individualized bills of exchange and promissory
notes did circulate as money in North America during the (British) colonial period. See id. at 15.
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economies in which marriage certificates could be—or, arguably, are—
exchanged. With respect to more traditional (i.e. non-marital) monies, a certain
kind of “public horizontal economy” has existed in the United States, with a
corresponding money. In this respect, with the advent of the Federal Reserve
System in the 1930s, a specific kind of paper note—the gold certificate—was
created for the exclusive use of the Federal Reserve Banks of this system. As
Richard Timberlake describes these certificates: “[T]hey were a kind of
currency. The gold certificates were the same size and design as other United
States currency, but were issued in a one-hundred-thousand-dollardenomination—hardly suitable for use at the local grocery store.” 95
With respect to paper marriage certificates, these certificates also function
in a horizontal economy created by and between public, governmental entities.
This kind of economy is a consequence of inter-state marriage recognition
practices, whereby states recognize and give force to marriages entered into
(legally) in other states. The phenomenon of inter-state recognition (or,
conversely, lack of recognition) 96 of marriage is a longstanding reality of
international law and practice. Within the contemporary United States, the
general practice of United States states has been to recognize marriages entered
into in any other United States state as long as local laws and rules in that other
state, the “place of celebration,” have been complied with. 97 In essence then, if
one gets legally married in one state, and moves to or travels in another state,
the receiving state “converts” the original state’s marriage license into one of
its own, and gives it effect and value as such. 98 In this way, the legal tender
quality of marriage certificates, at least in state government-to-state
government transactions emerges.
Moreover, this interstitial marriage economy is a very strong and deeply
rooted one. In this respect, for a very long time, states have worked hard to
ensure that their marriages—and marriage certificates—will be recognized and
given effect to and value by other states. Put another way, and in doctrinal
speak, states have been long and deeply concerned with creating “comity” with
sister states when it comes to the issuing of marriage certificates. For example,
while Massachusetts was the first United States state to issue marriage

95. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 51, at 289. See also NUSSBAUM, supra note 56, at 197 for
further description of these gold certificates.
96. Up until very recently when Obergefell finally resolved this issue, one of the more
vexing issues in Unites States family law was whether—or not—an officially heterosexual United
States state had to recognize a same-sex marriage entered into within the boundaries of another
United States state.
97. This “place of celebration” rule is embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971).
98. See generally Susan Frelich Appleton, Leaving Home? Domicile, Family, and Gender,
47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1453 (2014) (explaining but also complicating common analyses of this
general inter-state practice).
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certificates for same-sex couples, back in 2003, Massachusetts did not—as was
widely feared—become the “Las Vegas of same-sex marriage” 99 Instead,
Massachusetts, in the spirit of inter-state comity, refused to marry any couple
whose so-called home state did not permit same-sex marriage. 100 In other
words, Massachusetts extended the converse of the “place of celebration” rule
not only to refuse recognition to marriages illegally conducted elsewhere, but
also to refuse itself the opportunity to marry people whose home state makes
certain marriages illegal. Thus, Massachusetts would not marry an Alabama
same-sex couple since Alabama, explicitly and constitutionally, did not allow
same-sex marriage at the time. As the lead opinion in the Massachusetts legal
decision confirming this point of law noted: “[I]t is rational, and hopeful, for
the Commonwealth to believe that if it adheres to principles of comity and
respects the laws of other jurisdictions, then other jurisdictions will . . .
recognize same-sex marriages of Massachusetts couples.” 101
Ultimately, of course, each of the monetary analogues suggested in this
Part are open to suggestion and critique. 102 The argument here has not been to
suggest an exact equivalence between marriage certificates and any current or
historical form of money, but merely to suggest that there are “money-like”
aspects of marriage certificates which are hard to ignore (or forget) once this
Pandora’s box has been opened. Indeed, there may not be any “perfect”
monetary analogue for marriage certificates because monetary forms
themselves have been so experimental and pluralistic in nature over time.
Indeed, towards this point, it is again worth remembering that the United States
dollar is a relatively recent and radical monetary invention. It is not the only
kind or form of money—paper or otherwise—that has circulated in the United
States historically speaking, and it is not what marriage certificates must aspire
to in order to be considered monetary in nature.
If there has been any universal, across time, with respect to money in the
United States, it has been over the question of who has the authority to issue it.
And in this respect, the recent controversy over what Rowan County marriage
licenses must look like—and whether Kim Davis or the federal courts will
decide that—is perfectly consistent with this country’s controversial monetary
history. At least to the extent that we can understand marriage as being just as
much (or even moreso) about money rather than dignity.
99. See Pam Belluck, Romney Won’t Let Gay Outsiders Wed in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 25, 2004, at A1 (quoting Mitt Romney).
100. Massachusetts law at the time stated: “No marriage shall be contracted in this
commonwealth by a party residing and intending to continue to reside in another jurisdiction if
such marriage would be void if contracted in such other jurisdiction, and every marriage
contracted in this commonwealth in violation hereof shall be null and void.” Uniform Marriage
Evasion Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 11 (2007).
101. Cote-Whitacre v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623, 645 (Mass. 2006).
102. There are also probably other ones available altogether.
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CONCLUSION
Marriage has taken many forms across the breadth of United States
geography, demography, and history. The several forms of marriage witnessed
in this country have sometimes been controversial. Often they have been
quotidian. This Article has attempted to explain how and why a particular
quotidian form—namely, the marriage license—has now become so
controversial. Doing so has required a stepping back from typical narratives of
marriage and rights alike.
Observers of the development of civil rights have often been tempted to
see the historical struggle for civil rights as involving a sequence of pitched
and sequential battles between the forces of enviable progress and lamentable
tradition. According to this (simplistic) view of things, legal victories in each
of these battles helps set the stage for the next struggle, eventual legal victory
there, yet another stage and civil rights battle, and so on. In this way, for
example, the struggle for African-Americans’ rights in the United States has
been described as the necessary stepping stone for women’s right which, in
turn, has been described as the essential precursor to gay rights, and then
transgender rights.
Yet, in all this neat narrativizing, complexities get quashed. These
complexities pertain not only to what civil rights struggles “preceded”—or
ostensibly had to have preceded—other civil rights struggles, but also the ways
in which many so-called civil rights are not strictly about justice or freedom,
whether in meaning or origin. In suggesting the ways in which the latest round
of controversies concerning same-sex marriage have parallels to and origins in
United States constitutional and legal controversies concerning money, this
Article has suggested that the struggle for same-sex marriage—like other civil
right struggles—is a complex historical space. Moreover, it is one where
justice and selfishness—dignity and dollars—can both reside.
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